Sacrifice, Discounting and Climate Policy: Five Questions

I offer a selective review of discounting and climate policy. Analytic and numerical models show that different assumptions greatly change the degree to which decisions about climate policy depend on the discount rate. I discuss a claim that standard models exaggerate the current generation’s sacrifices needed to internalize climate damages. This claim, if correct, affects the role of discounting. I argue that the assertion that the risk of catastrophic damage overwhelms discounting is unfounded. I show that the claim that we “view the world in perspective” implies hyperbolic rather than constant discounting.climate change, discounting, intergenerational conflict, catastrophic risk, hyperbolic discounting

Risk Aversion in a Dynamic Trading Game

The effect of risk aversion on Nash equilibrium trade restrictions is studied using numerical methods. An increase in a nation's level of risk aversion can lead to either an increase or decrease in its equilibrium restriction and either an increase or decrease in its rival's restriction. The linear quadratic dynamic game is generalized to include risk aversion.International Relations/Trade,

LABOR ADJUSTMENT AND GRADUAL REFORM: IS COMMITMENT IMPORTANT?

We analyze a model in which a government uses a second best policy to affect the reallocation of labor, following a change in relative prices. We consider two extreme cases, in which the government has either unlimited or negligible ability to commit to future actions. We explain why the ability to make commitments may be unimportant, and we illustrate this conjecture with numerical examples. For either assumption about commitment ability, the equilibrium policy involves gradual liberalization. The dying sector is protected during the transition to a free market, in order to decrease the amount of unemployment Our results are sensitive to the assumptions about migration.adjustment costs, dynamic tariffs, time inconsistency, Markov perfection, Labor and Human Capital,

CLIMATE POLICY WHEN THE DISTANT FUTURE MATTERS: CATASTROPHIC EVENTS WITH HYPERBOLIC DISCOUNTING

Low probability catastrophic climate change can have a signifcant influence on policy under hyperbolic discounting. We compare the set of Markov Perfect Equilibria (MPE) to the optimal policy under time-consistent commitment. For some initial levels of risk there are multiple MPE; these may involve either excessive or insufficient stabilization effort. These results imply that even if the free-rider problem amongst contemporaneous decision-makers were solved, there may remain a coordination problem amongst successive generations of decision-makers. A numerical example shows that under plausible conditions society should respond vigorously to the threat of climate change.abrupt climate change, event uncertainty, catastrophic risk, hyperbolic discounting, Markov Perfect Equilibria, Environmental Economics and Policy, C61, C73, D63, D99, Q54,

The Welfare Effects of Imperfect Harmonization of Trade and Industrial Policy

Partial cooperation in setting trade policy may be worse than no cooperation for countries who form a customs union. The paper investigates three situations where this is likely to occur. First, if the countries forming the union comprise too small a percentage of the non-competitive sector of the industry, their cooperation may be disadvantageous for essentially the same reason that a merger may be disadvantageous in oligopolistic industries. Second, even if the countries forming the union comprise the entire non-competitive sector of industry, cooperation on trade policy may be disadvantageous if industrial policy (e.g. investment subsidies) are chosen non-cooperatively. The reason is that cooperation in trade policy may exacerbate the inefficiencies created by non-cooperation at an earlier stage. Third, cooperation in choosing trade policies may encourage excessive investment by competitive importers and thus reduce the demand faced by the oligopolists.Trade and industrial policy, imperfect competition, customs union, International Relations/Trade,

DISCOUNTING AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY

A constant social discount rate cannot reflect both a reasonable opportunity cost of public funds and an ethically defensible concern for generations in the distant future. We use a model of hyperbolic discounting that achieves both goals. We imbed this discounting model in a simple climate change model to calculate constant equivalent discount rates" and plausible levels of expenditure to control climate change. We compare these results to discounting assumptions and policy recommendations in the Stern Review on Climate Change.discounting, climate change modeling, Stern Review, Markov Perfect Equilibria, Environmental Economics and Policy, C61, C73, D63, D99, Q54,

DOMESTIC AND TRADE POLICY FOR CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN AGRICULTURE

International Relations/Trade,

Optimum Tariffs in a Distorted Economy: An Application to U.S. Agriculture

Optimal distortions for the agricultural sector are calculated taking as given distortions in the nonagricultural sector. The calculations use a general equilibrium model and assume that the sole criterion is economic efficiency. For most agricultural commodities, existing distortions should be decreased; for the cotton and oil bearing sector, however, the existing tariff should be increased.International Relations/Trade,

LIFETIME LEVERAGE CHOICE FOR PROPRIETARY FARMERS IN A DYNAMIC STOCHASTIC ENVIRONMENT

This article reviews various models that may be used to explain optimal leverage choice for the proprietary farmer in a stochastic dynamic environment and develops a new model that highlights the risk of failure rather than the usual concept of risk as the variability of wealth. The model suggests that in addition to the usual factors, farm financial leverage is affected by age, wealth, and the opportunity cost of farming.Farm Management,